As seventeen 47th Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantrymen were being spirited away to Texas for imprisonment by Confederate troops at Camp Ford, following the Battle of Pleasant Hill, Louisiana in mid-April 1864, the remaining members of their regiment were receiving orders to march for the village of Grand Ecore as part of a massive retreat by the Union’s Army of the Gulf that was commanded by Major-General Nathaniel P. Banks. Upon their arrival, the Union infantry and artillery troops reconnected with the Union Navy’s fleet of quartermaster ships that were carrying food and fresh ammunition for them. They then “immediately began entrenching,” according to military historian Lieutenant-Colonel Steven E. Clay (U.S. Army, retired).

On 11 April, two days after the battle at Pleasant Hill, Banks’ engineer officers supervised the layout and construction of a three-mile, semicircular line of entrenchments around the little hamlet. The works were substantial and utilized, in part, existing works previously prepared by [Confederate General Richard] Taylor’s men. The infantry troops felled large trees to build breastworks and reinforce the earthworks. The engineers constructed abatis and other obstacles, while the artillerymen built battery positions along likely avenues of approach. Each location was chosen to take advantage of the high ground and maximize kill zones. Though there was some skirmishing around Grand Ecore and later at Alexandria, the works were never seriously challenged by Taylor’s forces. The Confederate commander simply did not have enough men to make costly frontal assaults against entrenched troops.

* Note: Prior to that return to Grand Ecore, Banks was initially planning to continue with his original Red River Campaign objective to march his Army of the Gulf to Shreveport. According to historian Steven Clay:

Apparently buoyed by the army’s performance at Chapman’s Bayou and Pleasant Hill, Banks’ confidence had returned. Indeed, he even dispatched a message to Lee to turn around the trains and bring them back. Smith was in agreement with commanding general’s decision and rode off to tend to his troops and prepare them for the advance. All this, however, was before Banks met with other generals later that evening.

That plan changed, however, when three of Banks’ senior generals—Emory, Franklin and Mower—expressed their concerns about the feasibility of the proposed march “for several reasons.”

First, on the army’s present route there was no easy access to Porter’s naval support until arrival at Shreveport. Also, Banks’ next resupply of food and ammunition was located on the transports moving with Porter. Additionally, Emory’s division was almost out of food.

Second, no one knew the status of Porter’s flotilla, whether it was still moving north or if it had been captured or destroyed. There was no word even on whether Porter could reach Shreveport given the falling water level. Third, Banks had not heard anything regarding Steele’s progress in Arkansas. Was that column still en route, or had it met disaster? Fourth, it was now 10 April and Banks only had five days to capture Shreveport before Smith’s troops had to depart for Memphis. Was it possible to reach the city and take it in five days? Finally, there was still the lack of water in the pine barrens and precious little remained at Pleasant Hill. What was remaining would be gone by the morrow. Franklin offered that the army should march for Blair’s Landing to link there with Porter and be resupplied. From there a decision could be made about what to do next. Emory concurred. Dwight, Banks’ closest confidant, suggested that the army return to Grand Ecore since nothing had been heard from Porter. After considering the three options, Banks gave in, but selected the advice of the most junior general, Dwight.

Scrapping most of his original campaign objectives on 20 April 1864, Banks ordered the Army of the Gulf to retreat further—this time to Alexandria. That move unfolded over a period of several days, beginning with the departure of one of the Union’s cavalry units at 5 p.m. on 21 April.

The 47th Pennsylvania Volunteers departed the next day. While marching toward Alexandria, they were attacked again—this time at the rear of their retreating brigade but were able to quickly end the encounter and continue on, reaching Cloutierville at 10 p.m. that same night—after a forty-five-mile trek.

Battle of Monett’s Ferry and the Cane River Crossing

The next morning (23 April 1864), episodic skirmishing with Confederate troops quickly roared into the flames of a robust fight. As part of the advance party led by Union Brigadier-General William Emory, the 47th Pennsylvanians took on the Confederate cavalry of Brigadier-General Hamilton P. Bee in the Battle of Monett’s Ferry (also known as “the Affair at Monett’s Ferry” or the “Battle of Cane River/the Cane River Crossing”).

Responding to a barrage from the Confederate artillery’s twenty-pound Parrott guns and raking fire from enemy troops situated near a bayou and on a bluff, Brigadier-General Emory directed one of his brigades to keep Bee’s Confederates busy while sending his other two brigades to find a safe spot where his Union troops could ford the Cane River. As part of the “beekeepers,” the 47th Pennsylvania Volunteers supported Emory’s artillery.

Meanwhile, other troops serving with Emory’s brigade attacked Bee’s flank to force a Rebel retreat, and then erected a series of pontoon bridges that enabled the 47th and other remaining Union soldiers to make the Cane River Crossing by the next day. As the Confederates retreated, the Rebels torched their own food stores, as well as the cotton supplies of their fellow southerners.

In a letter penned from Morganza, Louisiana on 29 May, Henry Wharton described what had happened to the 47th Pennsylvanians during and immediately after making camp at Grand Ecore:

Our sojourn at Grand Ecore was for eleven days, during which time our position was well fortified by entrenchments for a length of five miles, made of heavy logs, five feet high and six feet wide, filled in with dirt. In front of this, trees were felled for a distance of two hundred yards, so that if the enemy attacked we had an open space before us which would enable our forces to repel them and follow if necessary. But our labor seemed to the men as useless, for on the morning of 22d April, the army abandoned these works and started for Alexandria. From our scouts it was ascertained that the enemy had passed some miles to our left with the intention of making a stand against our right at Bayou Cane, where there is a high bluff and dense woods, and at the same attack Smith’s forces who were bringing up the rear. This first day was a hard one on the boys, for by ten o’clock at night they made Cloutierville, a distance of forty-five miles. On that day the rear was attacked which caused our forces to reverse their front and form in line of battle, expecting too, to go back to the relief of Smith, but he needed no assistance, sending word to the front that he had ‘whipped them, and could do it again.’ It was well that Banks made so long a march on that day, for on the next we found the enemy prepared to carry out their design of attacking us front and rear. Skirmishing commenced early in the morning and as our columns advanced he fell back towards the bayou, when we soon discovered the position of their batteries on the bluff. There was then an artillery duel by the smaller pieces, and some sharp fighting by the cavalry, when the ‘mule battery,’ twenty pound Parrott guns, opened a heavy fire, which soon dislodged them, forcing the chivalry to flee in a manner not at all suitable to their boasted courage. Before this one cavalry, the 3d Brigade of the 1st Div., and Birges’ brigade of the second, had crossed the bayou and were doing good service, which, with the other work, made the enemy show their heels. The 3d brigade done some daring deeds in this fight, as also did the cavalry. In one instance the 3d charged up a hill almost perpendicular, driving the enemy back by the bayonet without firing a gun. The woods on this bluff was so thick that the cavalry had to dismount and fight on foot. During the whole of the day, our brigade, the 2d was supporting artillery, under fire all the time, and could not give Mr. Reb a return shot.

While we were fighting in front, Smith was engaged some miles in the rear, but he done his part well and drove them back. The rebel commanders thought by attacking us in the rear, and having a large face on the bluffs, they would be able to capture our train and take us all prisoners, but in this they were mistaken, for our march was so rapid that we were on them before they had thrown up the necessary earthworks. Besides they underrated the amount of our artillery, calculating from the number engaged at Pleasant Hill. The rebel prisoners say it ‘seems as though the Yankees manufacture, on short notice, artillery to order, and the men are furnished with wings when they wish to make a certain point.

The damage done to the Confederate cause by the burning of cotton was immense. On the night of the 22d our route was lighted up for miles and millions of dollars worth of this production was destroyed. This loss will be felt more by Davis & Co., than several defeats in this region, for the basis of the loan in England was on the cotton of Western Louisiana.’

After the rebels had fled from the bluff the negro troops put down the pontoons, and by ten that night we were six miles beyond the bayou safely encamped. The next morning we moved forward and in two days were in Alexandria. Johnnys followed Smith’s forces, keeping out of range of his guns, except when he had gained the eminence across the bayou, when he punished them (the rebs) severely.

* Note: According to historian Steven Clay, sometime before or during this engagement, engineers from the Army of the Gulf were sent back to the Cane River (on 23 April) in order to lay out a pontoon bridge near Monett’s Ferry, an objective they completed by or before 7 p.m.

All that night, the army retreated over the river and completed the crossing by noon the following day. The pontoon bridge was laid twice more during the retreat of the Army of the Gulf toward Simmesport [giving] the Army of the Gulf a significant mobility capacity that enabled it to easily cross what might otherwise have been major impediments to the movement of the force.

Killed or Wounded in Action:

Sheaffer, Reuben Moyer (alternate spellings: Schaeffer, Schaffer, Shaffer): Private, Company H; reported as wounded in action during either the Battle of Sabine Cross Roads/Mansfield on April 8, 1864 or the Battle of Pleasant Hill on April 9, he marched with his regiment to Grand Ecore. Although reported in U.S. Army records to have died at Grand Ecore on April 22, 1864, Private Sheaffer actually died sometime during the forty-five-mile march toward Cloutierville, according to a letter subsequently written by his commanding officer, Captain James Kacy, to First Lieutenant William Wallace Geety on May 29. According to Captain Kacy, “Schaffer died on the march of excessive fatigue. We marched in retreat from 1 AM to 11 PM 49 miles, and several died of it.” Prior to his death, Private Sheaffer had been in poor health. According to historian Lewis Schmidt, Private Sheaffer had been “hospitalized for five days with dysentery at Fort Jefferson on January 25, 1863; and again on February 18 with ‘Debiletas’ (rheumatism) for almost two weeks, as he was returned to duty on March 2.”

Captured and Held as Prisoner of War (POW):

Maul, Adam (alternate spellings: Moll, Moul): Private, Company C; captured by Confederate forces at the Cane River on May 3, 1864 while assigned to duties away from the regiment’s Alexandria, Louisiana encampment; held as a prisoner of war (POW) at Camp Ford, a Confederate Army prison camp near Tyler, Texas until being released as part of a prisoner exchange between the Union and Confederate armies on July 22, 1864; received medical treatment, recovered from his experience, and returned to duty with Company C.

How Did Union Army Leaders Communicate During the 1864 Red River Campaign

According to Clay, “Banks’ strategic line of communication was by way of courier boat down the Red and Mississippi Rivers to New Orleans.”

From there, ocean-going ships took messages directly to Washington, DC, or to another port which had telegraphic communications with the capital. It was usually about a month-long process under the best of conditions. Thus, Lincoln, Halleck, and Grant were forced to provide suggestions, instructions, and orders that were broad in nature and allowed Banks to manage the details.

At the tactical level, Banks and his subordinates typically communicated by horse-mounted courier, both up and down the chain of command and laterally. Though Banks possessed trained signal teams in his army, the nature of the terrain precluded effective use of flag and light signals. The only time the Signal Corps was able to function in battle with flag teams was briefly at the battle of Monett’s Ferry and at Alexandria, after the retreat from Grand Ecore. At Alexandria, Capt. Frank W. Marston, Chief Signal Officer for the department, was later able to set up a line of signal stations to facilitate communications between Banks’ headquarters with the outlying headquarters of the army’s major commands and Porter’s gunboats.

Additionally, the Army of the Gulf possessed a tactical telegraph capability during the Red River Campaign. It consisted of a telegraph train of five wagons, three of which carried large reels of wire. There were four civilian telegraph operators and several other teamsters and support personnel, all under the command of Capt. Charles S. Bulkley.

Entry into Alexandria, Louisiana

After reaching Alexandria on April 26, 1864, the 47th Pennsylvania Volunteers and other Union artillery and infantry troops reconnected once again with the Union Navy’s fleet of quartermaster ships, which provided them with additional ammunition and food. When Confederate States Army troops “closed off the Red River below the city,” shortly thereafter, according to Clay, Major-General Banks ordered his troops “out on forays into rebel-held areas outside the city” to ensure that the U.S. Army of the Gulf would have enough food and other supplies to last a planned two-week occupation of the city.

Taylor responded by ordering his troops to take or burn anything the Federals could possibly use within miles of Alexandria. Eventually, however, Porter’s gunboats reopened the river and forage arrived in enough quantities for the horses to pull their loads southward. Soon after, Banks ordered the surplus stores, tools, and equipment loaded on army transports and sent down river. On 12 May, the army started its return trip back to Simmesport. The train was now up to 976 wagons, 105 ambulances, and 12,000 horses and mules. Few supply problems were encountered en route. Indeed, in actions which presaged Sherman’s forthcoming Savannah Campaign, many soldiers, especially A. J. Smith’s men, helped themselves to whatever foodstuffs (and other things) they wanted from the homes and farms along the way.

 

Sources:

1. Bates, Samuel P. History of Pennsylvania Volunteers, 1861-5, vol. 1. Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: B. Singerly, State Printer, 1869.
2. “Battle Detail: Monett’s Ferry,” in “The Civil War.” Washington, D.C.: U.S. National Park Service, retrieved online April 21, 2024.
3. Clay, Steven E. The Staff Ride Handbook for the Red River Campaign, 7 March-19 May 1864. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, U.S. Army Combined Arms Centers, 2023.
4. Dollar, Susan E. “The Red River Campaign, Natchitoches Parish, Louisiana: A Case of Equal Opportunity Destruction,” in Louisiana History: The Journal of the Louisiana Historical Association, vol. 43, no. 4 (Autumn 2002), pp. 411-432, accessed April 22, 2024. Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana Historical Association.
5. Prisoner of War Records, Camp Ford and Camp Groce (47th Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry). Tyler Texas: Smith County Historical Society, 2010.
6. “Report of Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks, U. S. Army, Commanding Expedition and Department of the Gulf” (to Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War), in Annual Report of the Secretary of War, in Message of the President of the United States, and Accompanying Documents, to the Two Houses of Congress, at the Commencement of the First Session of the Thirty-Ninth Congress. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1866.
7. Schmidt, Lewis G. A Civil War History of the 47th Regiment of Pennsylvania Veteran Volunteers. Allentown, Pennsylvania: Self-published, 1986.
8. “The History of the Forty-Seventh Regt. P. V.” Allentown, Pennsylvania: The Lehigh Register, July 20, 1870.
9. “War on the Red: A look at the Red River Campaign of 1864,” in “News.” Natchitoches, Louisiana: Cane River National Heritage Area, retrieved online April 22, 2024.
10. Wharton, Henry D. “Letters from the Sunbury Guards, 1861-1868. Sunbury, Pennsylvania, Sunbury American.